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Abstract  
This paper explores consumers’ commitment to and conviction about their beliefs in the form of 
attitude certainty. Based on a review of past research, we present a new framework for 
understanding attitude certainty and how consumers’ attitude certainty is shaped by their 
resisting or yielding to persuasive messages, or even by their reflections on the evidence 
supporting their attitudes. We propose that attitude certainty is formed and changed largely 
through an attribution-based reasoning process linked to a finite set of distinct appraisals. Our 
framework is used to both organize past research and offer guidance for future research 
endeavors. In addition, we distinguish our framework of appraisal-based attitude certainty from 
past models in attitudes and persuasion research that have referenced or taken note of the attitude 
certainty construct. Implications and future directions for the study of consumer behavior are 
discussed. 
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A fundamental goal of consumer psychology is to understand and predict consumer 
behavior. In service of this objective, consumer psychologists have long recognized the 
importance of understanding consumers’ attitudes—that is, their global evaluative assessments 
of products or brands (see Petty & Briñol, 2008, for a review). Indeed, over the years researchers 
from many different perspectives have offered converging support for the importance of attitudes 
in affecting consumers’ behavior (e.g., Sheppard, Hartwick, & Warshaw, 1988), their 
information processing (e.g., Maheswaran & Sternthal, 1990), and even their basic perception 
(e.g., Fazio, Ledbetter, & Towles-Schwen, 2000). As a consequence, the study of attitudes and 
persuasion has become woven into the fabric of consumer behavior research. 
A rapidly expanding literature in consumer psychology suggests that to truly understand 
behavior one must also understand attitude certainty. Attitude certainty refers to the subjective 
sense of conviction one has about one’s attitude, or the extent to which one believes one’s 
attitude is correct or valid (e.g., Gross, Holtz, & miller, 1995; Petty, Briñol, Tormala, & 
Wegener, 2007). Certainty is a metacognitive tag on an attitude that reflects a secondary 
assessment (i.e., “Is my evaluation correct?”) of a primary cognition (i.e., the evaluation itself).1 
Even when a persuasive effort (e.g., an advertisement or an interpersonal appeal) does not 
produce attitude change (i.e., it does not modify the valence or extremity of an attitude), the 
appeal can have important but previously hidden effects on attitude certainty.  
Contributions and Objectives of the Present Review 
 The current review introduces a new framework outlining the appraisal-based processes 
through which attitude certainty can be formed or altered, and generates new directions for future 
                                                        
1 When describing certainty, scholars have used synonymous terms including confidence, commitment, and 
correctness (Gross et al., 1995). Although other meanings of attitude certainty can be construed (e.g., attitude clarity; 
Petrocelli, Tormala, & Rucker, 2007; see also Cohen & Reed, 2006), we focus on perceived validity or correctness 
in this review as this approach covers the treatment of certainty in the bulk of the contemporary literature. 
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research. Although attitude certainty has been reviewed elsewhere (see Gross, et al., 1995; Petty 
et al., 2004; Tormala & Rucker, 2007), the present paper departs from these past efforts in 
several key ways. First, whereas prior reviews discuss some variables that affect certainty, the 
present review provides a more comprehensive list and, more importantly, explores why 
particular variables affect attitude certainty. We introduce, for the first time, six specific 
appraisals consumers use to form attitude certainty and offer new insight into how distinct 
variables (e.g., social consensus, consistency of information) can have similar or different 
influences on certainty. By outlining the core psychological appraisals underlying certainty, the 
current review enables us to explore higher order questions such as whether previously identified 
antecedents to certainty might interact, as well as whether there is a hierarchy among the 
appraisals. After discussing these issues, we distinguish the current framework from past theories 
in psychology and marketing that have incorporated the attitude certainty construct at some level. 
To begin, though, we offer a brief primer on attitude certainty and its relation to attitude strength.  
Attitude Certainty and Attitude Strength 
Attitude certainty is a dimension of attitude strength. Attitude strength refers to an 
attitude’s durability and impact.  Some attitudes are “stronger” than other attitudes in that they 
are more likely to resist change, persist over time, influence information processing and 
judgment, and guide behavior. A number of distinct factors contribute to the overall strength of 
an attitude including, but not limited to, an attitude’s certainty, accessibility, extremity, 
importance, and associated knowledge (see Petty & Krosnick, 1995).  
Although a number of factors contribute to the strength of an attitude, these factors can be 
conceptually and empirically separated from each other. For instance, attitudes that are 
equivalent in extremity can be held with differential certainty (Tormala & Petty, 2002; Rucker & 
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Petty, 2004). Similarly, highly accessible attitudes can be held with varying degrees of certainty. 
One aspect of attitude certainty that separates it from accessibility, extremity, or knowledge is 
that attitude certainty is inherently metacognitive. That is, attitude certainty reflects a person’s 
subjective assessment of his or her own attitude. Other strength dimensions, such as accessibility, 
extremity, elaboration, or knowledge have been studied both through subjective and objective 
measures. For example, knowledge might be assessed subjectively by asking participants how 
much they know or objectively by scoring their responses to trivia on that topic (see Wegener et 
al, 1995). Although prior research rarely distinguishes between subjective and objective 
measures (Bassili, 1996), there is no objective measure of certainty; thus, its formation is largely 
linked to subjective, metacognitive, or attributional inputs, which we will discuss. 
What attitude certainty does share in common with other strength dimensions is that 
attitudes held with certainty tend to be resistant, persistent, and influential on people’s thoughts 
and behavior. Generally speaking, attitudes held with high (versus low) certainty are more 
resistant to persuasive attacks (e.g., Bassili, 1996; c.f. Clarkson, Tormala, & Rucker, 2008). For 
instance, Tormala and Petty (2004) found that individuals certain of their attitude towards a new 
exam policy were more likely to rebuke an effort to change those attitudes. Attitudes held with 
greater certainty are also more persistent over time. Bassili (1996) demonstrated that as certainty 
in attitudes toward a political candidate increased, people were more likely to have a similar 
attitude 10 or more days later. Persistence is conceptually distinct from resistance (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986) as attitudes that are never attacked might differentially persist as time passes, 
and attitudes that uniformly persist across a given timeframe might differentially crumble once 
challenged. Attitude certainty has also been shown to influence information processing; the 
typical finding is that increases in certainty are associated with decreases in processing activity 
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(e.g., Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991; c.f., Tormala, Rucker, & Seger, 2008; Wan & Rucker, 
2013). Finally, attitudes held with high (versus low) certainty are more likely to influence 
behavior. In one classic study, Fazio and Zanna (1978a) found that undergraduates’ attitudes 
towards participation in psychology experiments were better predictors of actual participation 
when held with high rather than low certainty.  
The effect of attitude certainty on attitude persistence, resistance, and influence is likely 
to be the result of multiple processes. As one example, increased certainty may foster resistance 
because high certainty signals to a consumer that an attitude is correct; thus, the perceived 
amount of evidence required to change that attitude might be greater. Alternatively, certainty 
might provide consumers with the needed motivation to approach counterattitudinal information 
in a more aggressive (biased) fashion (Wood, Rhodes, & Biek, 1995), perhaps because they 
believe they can withstand or overcome it (Albarracín & Mitchell, 2004). As a result, people 
might be more likely to find fault in counterattitudinal information when they have high certainty 
(Lord et al., 1979; Pomerantz, Chaiken, & Tordesillas, 1995). Finally, certainty might signal a 
reduced need for additional information (Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991), which then lowers 
attention to any new information and reduces the likelihood of being influenced by it. 
Appraisal-Based Certainty 
Despite extensive research on the consequences of attitude certainty, there have been 
scarce attempts in psychology or marketing to identify the fundamental factors that lead 
consumers to feel more or less certain of their attitudes. Attention has been devoted to 
highlighting various antecedents of certainty (see Tormala & Rucker, 2007), but not to 
integrating this knowledge into a set of core factors.  In this review, we outline what we believe 
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the literature suggests are the key metacognitive appraisals that underlie consumers’ assessments 
of and adjustments to their own attitude certainty.   
As a starting point, we explore how attitude certainty is adjusted following exposure to a 
persuasive appeal. We propose that when consumers resist or yield to a persuasive message, they 
can draw inferences from the persuasion process that informs them of how certain they are (or 
should be) of their attitudes (Petty, Tormala, & Rucker, 2004). Specifically, when consumers 
resist or yield to persuasion, they can form attribution-like inferences or appraisals about the 
information underlying—or evidence supporting—their attitudes. When individuals are 
impressed with the evidence supporting their attitudes, we posit they form positive appraisals 
that lead to more attitude certainty. When individuals are unimpressed with the evidence 
supporting their attitudes, however, they will form negative appraisals that lead to less attitude 
certainty. When individuals are neither impressed nor unimpressed by the evidence supporting 
their attitudes, or they simply do not engage in the appraisal process, they can be said to have a 
neutral appraisal (or no appraisal) and there is likely to be no change in their attitude certainty. 
To illustrate, consider a situation in which two consumers resist a salesperson’s pitch.  
Despite their common resistance outcome, these consumers might differ in their appraisals of the 
resistance process and what that means for their attitudes.  For example, one consumer might 
perceive that although he resisted, it was difficult to do so (e.g., “I almost gave in… I just 
couldn’t think of any good counterarguments.”), resulting in a negative resistance appraisal and 
reduced attitude certainty (“Maybe I’m not right after all.”).  In contrast, another consumer might 
perceive that he or she resisted and that it was quite easy to do so (e.g., “I absolutely refuted that 
attempt to persuade me… It was easy to think of compelling counterarguments on the spot.”), 
which we submit would result in a positive resistance appraisal and increased attitude certainty 
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(“I must really be right!”). In this scenario, the two consumers might hold similar looking 
attitudes—both negative toward the item the salesperson pitched, and equally so—yet those 
attitudes now crucially differ in their underlying certainty. If true, we would expect these 
consumers to engage in different future behavior and show differential openness to future 
persuasion on the same topic (Petty et al., 2007; Tormala & Rucker, 2007).  
 Consistent with this idea, a growing body of research suggests that when individuals 
engage in an effort to resist a persuasion attempt, their appraisals of their own success or failure 
can affect their attitude certainty. For example, Tormala and Petty (2002) induced participants to 
counterargue a message described to be either strong or weak in the arguments it contained.  In 
actuality, everyone received the same message. Although all participants resisted the message 
(i.e., showed no attitude change in the direction of that message), participants were more certain 
of their attitudes when they believed they had resisted a strong message (which seems 
impressive) rather than weak message (which seems less impressive).  In related work, Rucker 
and Petty (2004) demonstrated that when people were persuaded by an advertisement, they were 
more certain of their post-message attitudes when they had made a concerted effort to consider 
potential negative aspects of the message as opposed to only positive aspects. Here, changing 
one’s attitude after a deliberate attempt to consider potential negative information was more 
impressive with respect to the strength of evidence supporting the new attitude. Of course, 
people can appraise their attitudes even when they have not recently resisted or yielded to a 
persuasive message. For example, Petrocelli, Tormala, and Rucker (2007) asked undergraduates 
to report their own attitude on a topic (i.e., a new university policy) and then told them that a 
majority or minority of students agreed with them. Participants subsequently felt more certain in 
their attitudes when they viewed themselves as holding a majority rather than a minority opinion.  
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Underlying Dimensions of Appraisal-Based Certainty 
 Considerable evidence from the last few decades suggests that people adjust their attitude 
certainty in response to situational variables—for example, their perceptions of how they have 
responded to persuasive appeals or whether the evidence supports or contradicts their attitude on 
a given topic. Nevertheless, little work has integrated the field’s collective insights about attitude 
certainty to offer a cohesive framework outlining the core appraisals people form that lead them 
to feel more or less certain of a given attitude or opinion. That is, we know many of the specific 
variables that affect attitude certainty, but not necessarily why those particular antecedents foster 
certainty or uncertainty.  For instance, why does resisting a persuasive attack believed to be 
strong, or believed to come from an expert, leads one to feel more certain? Conversely, why does 
struggling to resist a persuasive attack—but still in fact resisting it—undermine one’s certainty 
(Tormala, Clarkson, & Petty, 2006)? Do these effects emerge from similar or different 
underlying inferences?  
 We propose that attitude certainty stems from a finite set of psychological appraisals that 
can be identified, measured, and manipulated. Based on a review of attitude certainty research in 
psychology and marketing, we postulate that consumers appraise their attitudes along six core 
dimensions to determine their attitude certainty. Furthermore, the myriad of studies of certainty 
in past research can be organized along these dimensions. These appraisals concern the accuracy, 
completeness, relevance, legitimacy, and importance of the evidence supporting people’s 
attitudes, as well as the feelings surrounding retrieving, using, and thinking about those attitudes, 
which we term affective validation. Although certainty can be shaped by false feedback (e.g., 
telling people they are certain; Marks & Miller, 1985), the bulk of the literature centers on cases 
in which people make inferences about their own certainty based on the information they have 
 10 
and/or the manner in which they acquired it. We next present the key appraisals, and we review 
how the known antecedents of attitude certainty map onto each one. 
Appraisals Related to the Accuracy of Information Underlying an Attitude 
 One appraisal that consumers can generate relates to whether the information underlying 
their attitude is accurate. If one views the information comprising an attitude as true, then one 
can infer that the attitude itself is correct. Thus, the more accurate one perceives the information 
underlying an attitude to be, the more likely one is to form a positive appraisal of one’s attitude 
and feel more certain about it. Examples of variables (i.e., antecedents to certainty) associated 
with accuracy include: social consensus, consistency of information, and direct experience. 
Social consensus. Learning that a majority, compared to a minority, of one’s peers, 
shares one’s attitude fosters greater attitude certainty (Festinger, 1954; Petrocelli et al., 2007; 
Visser & Mirabile, 2004). For example, undergraduate participants were more certain when told 
that a majority, rather than minority, of their fellow students shared their attitudes on a campus 
issue (Petrocelli et al., 2007). This effect can be understood as the result of an accuracy appraisal. 
The logic, originally outlined by Festinger (1954), is that if other people reached the same 
conclusion as oneself, and especially if they reached it in the same way (Tormala, DeSensi, 
Clarkson, & Rucker, 2009), the information comprising one’s attitude is likely to be accurate. As 
a result, one can be more certain that the global attitude is correct.  
Consistency of information. The internal consistency of one’s beliefs can also affect 
perceived accuracy. In general, as the information underlying an attitude becomes more 
consistent—that is, evaluatively congruent—people become more certain of that attitude 
(Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991; Smith et al., 2008; Tormala & DeSensi, 2009). In contrast, if 
one piece of information (e.g., a favorable product attribute) is challenged by an opposing piece 
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of information (e.g., a negative customer review), each piece of information becomes more 
questionable in terms of its accuracy. Such inconsistency could reduce the certainty with which a 
consumer holds an overall attitude (see Koriat, 2012). For example, Smith and colleagues (2008) 
found that participants’ attitudes towards a department store were held with greater certainty 
when the information about the store that was structurally consistent (i.e., all positive or all 
negative) versus inconsistent (i.e., a mix of positive and negative information). Research on 
consideration of alternative hypotheses is compatible with this general notion. Koehler (1994) 
found that when people generate hypotheses in favor of multiple possible outcomes (e.g., what a 
person’s occupation might be), they feel less confident compared to when they generate a 
hypothesis in favor of just one outcome. This finding suggests that generating alternative 
hypotheses sensitizes people to the possibility that their own assessment might not be accurate. 
Perceived inconsistency can arise and provoke uncertainty even when information is 
evaluatively congruent. A consumer might believe a product is high in quality and low in price—
both desirable features but potentially incompatible. Because they are incompatible, the 
combination of these features might reduce the certainty with which the consumer holds her 
overall (favorable) attitude. Thus, even holding valence constant, conceptual incongruity in the 
content of one’s beliefs might cast doubt upon those beliefs and undermine attitude certainty. On 
the flip side, conflicting information might sometimes be viewed as accurate. For example, one 
might believe that eating chocolate cake is good because it tastes great but bad because it has 
high calories. Under these conditions, inconsistency may produce ambivalent attitudes (e.g., see 
Priester & Petty, 1996) held with high certainty (Clarkson, Tormala, & Rucker 2008).  
Direct experience. People tend to be more certain of their attitudes when they are based 
on primitive beliefs (Rokeach, 1968) or beliefs that stem from first-hand experience with the 
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attitude object (Fazio & Zanna, 1978a, 1978b). For example, a consumer might see an 
advertisement for a car or test drive the car. In both cases, the consumer might have a similar 
piece of information (e.g., the car handles well), but acquiring that information from direct 
experience fosters greater attitude certainty. We submit that direct experience affects certainty 
due to accuracy appraisals because first-hand experience is likely viewed as more valid than 
second-hand experience (see Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). In a classic demonstration, Wu and 
Shaffer (1987) had participants form a preference between two peanut butters. In one condition, 
participants tasted the peanut butters and formed their preference (more direct experience). In the 
second condition, participants were told that the product could not be sampled and instead 
inspected the packaging of the peanut butters, which contained facts such as product ingredients 
(less direct experience). Participants were more confident of their preference when they had 
tasted the product rather than merely inspected the packaging.  In this case, greater certainty 
could also have stemmed from taste being a more important than packaging as a determinant of 
peanut butter attitudes (we discuss importance appraisals shortly), but it is likely that even if 
information about taste was conveyed indirectly, confidence would be higher in the direct taste 
experience condition due to greater trust in the validity of one’s own experiences.   
Appraisals Related to Completeness of Information Underlying an Attitude 
Separate from accuracy, consumers can assess information completeness (e.g., “Do I 
have enough information about this product?”). As consumers perceive themselves to have 
access to more information, regardless of how much information they actually have, their 
attitude certainty increases. More information signals that there are fewer unknowns that might 
disconfirm the attitude (c.f., Priester, Petty, & Park, 2007). We submit that at any given level of 
accuracy, perceiving that one has more complete information should result in greater certainty.  
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Amount of information. The most basic assessment of completeness relates to the sheer 
amount of information people think they have. The more information people believe they have, 
the more complete they perceive the information underlying their attitude to be and, thus, the 
more certain they are of that attitude (Smith et al., 2008; c.f. Muthukrishnan, Pham, & Mungale, 
2001). Consistent with this notion, Sanbonmatsu, Kardes, and Herr (1992) found that when 
people are alerted to potentially missing information, they exhibit less certainty about their 
attitudes. For example, in one experiment participants were either prompted or not prompted to 
consider various features of a bicycle. All participants then received information about the bike 
that did not include information about one of the features mentioned in the prompt. Sanbonmatsu 
et al. found that people were less certain of their attitudes when they had been prompted with a 
feature that was not presented. Presumably, participants under these conditions had concerns 
about the completeness of the information available that lowered their attitude certainty. 
Similarly, Sabonmatsu, Kardes, Posavac, and Houghton (1997) found that a set of information 
seemed less complete to participants when they had previously read a larger set of information 
about an unrelated attitude object (see also Tormala & Petty, 2007). Consistent with the idea that 
completeness appraisals are different from accuracy appraisals, Tsai, Klayman, and Hastie 
(2008) demonstrated that confidence increases with the amount of information available, even 
when that information has no influence on accuracy.  
Of course, the fact that missing information undermines certainty does not mean people 
are always sensitive to it. Indeed, work on omission neglect alluded to previously suggests that 
people often fail to recognize when they are missing information, which is one reason for 
consumer overconfidence (see Sanbonmatsu, Kardes, & Sansone, 1991, Sanbonmatsu, Kardes, & 
Herr, 1992, 2003).  That is, people can be poorly calibrated when it comes to assessing their own 
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information or knowledge, thinking they have more information than they really do.  This 
misperception can falsely elevate confidence and further underscores the relationship between 
perceived amount of information (independent of actual information) and certainty.2 
Consideration of both sides. As noted earlier, consumers hold their attitudes with more 
certainty when they perceive them to be based on a consideration of both the pros and cons of an 
attitude object (Rucker & Petty, 2004; Rucker et al., 2008). Perceiving oneself, or those 
presenting the information, to have considered both the pros and the cons of a message suggests 
that the information underlying one’s attitude is more complete than if only side had been 
considered. As one example, Rucker and colleagues (2008) presented participants with a 
persuasive message promoting a mountain bike. In some conditions, the message suggested that 
the source had considered both positive and negative reactions to the product, whereas in other 
conditions no suggestion was present. Participants reported greater certainty when the message 
was described as having considered both sides. Moreover, consistent with the idea of a 
completeness appraisal, Rucker et al. found that differences in certainty were mediated by 
differences in perceptions associated with the completeness of the information they had received. 
In a similar vein, Bizer, Larsen, and Petty (2011) found that getting people to think about 
their election attitudes in terms of which candidate they opposed (e.g., I am against the 
Republican) rather than who they favored (e.g., I support the Democrat) led to greater certainty 
in their choice and greater willingness to act on their attitude.  Opposition framing also causes 
attitudes to become more resistant to change (Bizer & Petty, 2005).  Bizer et al. suggested that an 
                                                        
2 In domains of fact, people might be overconfident in beliefs to the extent they have confidence in a belief that is 
objectively false (e.g., I am confident smoking has no affect on cancer). However, as attitudes are idiosyncratic 
evaluations reflecting an individual’s like or dislike (e.g., I enjoy smoking), the meaning of overconfidence is much 
less clear in the attitude domain. Thus, our focus is on what makes people subjectively more or less certain of their 
attitudes, and the importance of that assessment in understanding how and when attitudes guide behavior, rather than 
on whether an individual’s attitude certainty reflects overconfidence or not.  
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opposition frame is more likely to make salient the negatives of the disfavored candidate as well 
as the contrasting positives of the favored candidate whereas a supporting frame tends to focus 
attention only on the positives of the preferred candidate.  If an opposition frame is more likely 
than a supportive frame to make both sides salient, then attitude certainty is likely to increase 
with opposition framing due to the perception of more complete information about the choice. 
Perceived Thought. People are more certain of their attitudes when they think they have 
processed attitude-relevant information in a careful and thorough manner as opposed to a cursory 
and superficial manner (e.g., Smith et al., 2008). This is true irrespective of whether the appraisal 
stems from actual, or merely perceived, differences in the amount of thought (Barden & Petty, 
2008). The rationale for this effect can be linked to a completeness appraisal. The more 
extensively or carefully one has processed information, the more likely one has absorbed all of 
the information presented, and the less likely pertinent details have been overlooked. In one 
study (Wan, Rucker, Tormala & Clarkson, 2010, Experiment 2), consumers read a print 
advertisement for a new brand of toothpaste. Consumers who were mentally depleted (compared 
to non-depleted) perceived themselves to be more thorough in processing that message and, thus, 
held their post-message attitudes with greater certainty. 
Appraisals Related to Relevance, Legitimacy, and Importance of Information 
Next, we examine three related but distinct appraisals: relevance, legitimacy, and 
importance of information. We group them here as there is less available research on each of 
these appraisals. Importantly, though, these appraisals are conceptually distinct and there is 
initial evidence for each of them in past research.  
Relevance. Perhaps the most fundamental aspect of a piece of information, in terms of 
assessing its impact on attitude certainty, is whether that information is attitude-relevant. For 
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example, a home shopper might perceive the layout of a particular house as extremely relevant to 
her overall attitude toward that house, whereas the fact that the owner of the house has a BMW 
parked outside is irrelevant, though both factors could exert some influence on her attitude. We 
propose that the more one thinks one’s attitude is based on relevant information, the more certain 
one will be of one’s attitude. Although not studied directly with respect to attitude certainty, 
research by Snyder and Kendzierski (1982) suggests that when attitudes are viewed as more 
relevant to a particular behavior, they are more likely to guide that behavior.  Given the role that 
attitude certainty can play in attitude-behavior relations, it could be that relevance boosted 
attitude certainty in that research, thus increasing attitude-behavior consistency. 
Individual difference variables might affect the type of information people view as 
relevant. For example, although they have yet to be tied to attitude certainty, individual 
differences in self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974) have been shown to affect the type of information 
people view as relevant; low self-monitors are more likely to view quality-related information as 
relevant, whereas high self-monitors are more likely to view image-related information as 
relevant (Petty & Wegener, 1998). Thus, in the formation of attitude certainty, low-self monitors 
might be more certain following quality-related information and credible sources, whereas high-
self monitors would be more certain following exposure to image-related information and 
attractive sources (e.g., Evans & Clark, 2012). 
Legitimacy. In addition to assessing relevance, people can appraise whether information 
is legitimate (i.e., acceptable) or illegitimate (i.e., unacceptable) to use in forming an attitude. In 
legal settings, judges often ask jurors to disregard evidence or statements made in a trial. This 
does not mean the information is incorrect, incomplete, or irrelevant, but rather that it is not 
viewed as allowable input into assessing the defendant’s guilt. Likewise, consumers can 
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determine whether a piece of information provides a legitimate basis for determining their 
attitudes toward products and services. For example, an online review might state a consumer is 
disappointed with a product because the shipping company delivered a damaged box, but another 
consumer reading the review might view the shipping process as an illegitimate when trying to 
assess one’s attitude towards the product. We suggest that when individuals perceive that they 
have utilized information that is as illegitimate rather than legitimate, even if that information is 
accurate, complete, and relevant, it undermines attitude certainty.  
 Tormala, DeSensi, and Petty (2007) offer evidence for the impact of legitimacy 
appraisals on attitude certainty. Participants were induced to resist a persuasive message 
associated with a source in the numerical minority. Using false feedback, the authors 
manipulated participants’ perceptions of (1) whether they had resisted because of the minority 
source (e.g., rather than counterarguing), and (2) whether this was a legitimate or illegitimate 
means of resistance. Participants were the least certain of their attitudes when they believed they 
had illegitimately relied on the minority source information to resist persuasion. Notably, 
participants may have viewed the source’s minority status as relevant (e.g., knowing that a small 
number of people endorse a message could be perceived as relevant to assessing its accuracy), 
but they believed that it was illegitimate to use as the sole basis for opposing a position. 
Elsewhere, work on the persuasion knowledge model suggests that consumers can hold 
different views of what influence tactics are legitimate for marketers to use (Campbell and 
Kirmani, 2008). For example, some consumers might view the use of paid spokespeople as a 
legitimate marketing strategy while other consumers view this same strategy as illegitimate. 
Based on the idea of legitimacy appraisals, we submit that if consumers are equally persuaded by 
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a message, they should be more certain of their attitudes when they persuaded by techniques that 
they view as legitimate rather than illegitimate.  
Importance. Individuals also are likely to be more certain of their attitudes when they 
believe those attitudes are based on information that is important. For example, for some 
individuals deciding whether or not to go on a blind date, knowing the religious values of the 
other individual might be of paramount importance compared to knowing their age or education. 
Although age and education might also be viewed as legitimate and relevant pieces of 
information, they are not as important as the individual’s religious affiliation. Thus, if two people 
have similar amounts of information, equivalent in accuracy, legitimacy, and relevance, the 
individual who views the information as important, versus unimportant, is likely to be more 
certain.  Indeed, all else equal, attitudes based on information viewed as important (e.g., 
important values) should be held with greater certainty (see Blankenship and Wegener 2008). 
 Zakay (1985) presented participants with medical scenarios involving two patients who 
both signaled for help simultaneously. Participants were given information about each patient’s 
general health condition (i.e., bad versus medium), mental state (e.g., anxious versus depressed), 
and age (25 versus 55). Pre-testing revealed that individuals viewed the general condition of the 
patient as the most important variable in considering whom to help first. In one scenario, 
participants had to choose to help either an anxious 25-year old with a bad general health 
condition or a depressed 55-year old with a moderate general health condition. Participants were 
more certain of their decision when that decision was based on the most important dimension 
(i.e., general health) rather than a secondary dimension (i.e., age or mental state).  
 Applicability across situations. Relevance, legitimacy, and importance appraisals differ 
in a crucial way from appraisals related to accuracy and completeness. Appraisals related to 
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accuracy and completeness are likely to hold across situations; if one’s information is correct or 
complete, it is correct and complete in general—that is, regardless of the context. In contrast, 
information could be legitimate, relevant, and important to one attitude or in one situation, but 
the same information (though still correct and complete) could be illegitimate, irrelevant, or 
unimportant to another attitude or in another situation. In this way, the relevance, legitimacy, and 
importance dimensions have more in common with the current diagnosticity of information 
(Feldman & Lynch, 1988; Lynch et al., 1988) than with its general accuracy or completeness.   
To illustrate, suppose a consumer with a favorable attitude towards a car learns that the 
car can achieve a maximum speed of 180mph. If this information is accurate, this information is 
accurate regardless of whether the consumer is considering the car as a practical car for everyday 
use or as a sports car for weekend use. However, this information might be viewed as 
differentially relevant across these contexts. A maximum speed of 180mph might be viewed as 
highly relevant in assessing one’s attitude towards the car as a sports car for the weekend, but 
less relevant to assessing one’s attitude towards the car as a practical car for everyday use. 
Importantly, although relevance, legitimacy, and importance are conceptually linked, we keep 
them distinct because, as articulated earlier, a variable can affect one without affecting the other. 
Appraisals Related to Subjective Experience: Affective Validation  
 Finally, rather than focus on informational properties of an attitude or attitude object, 
individuals can reflect on their own subjective feelings surrounding an attitude to assess their 
certainty about it. For instance, a consumer might feel certain of an attitude because it feels right 
(e.g., Cesario, Grant, & Higgins, 2004). Petty and Briñol (2006) labeled this type of assessment 
“affective validation” as the individual’s attitude is validated or invalidated through his or her 
personal subjective experience. Stated differently, whereas the other appraisals covered rely on 
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cognitive assessments of information underlying an attitude (e.g., accuracy, completeness), 
affective validation revolves around feelings associated with the attitude.  Thus, emotions of 
positive valence (e.g., happiness, contentment, joy) tend to affectively validate attitudes, whereas 
emotions of negative valence (e.g., anger, fear, disgust) tend to invalidate attitudes (cf., Briñol, 
Petty, & Barden, 2007). Indeed, any time a person comes to feel certain of an attitude solely by 
assessing how he or she feels about it, affective validation is at work. 
Of importance, emotions need not validate attitudes solely by the valence of feelings they 
induce.  Based on appraisal theories of emotion (e.g., Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), Tiedens and 
Linton (2001) argued that some emotions (e.g., happiness, anger) are associated with certainty, 
whereas others (e.g., sadness, surprise) are associated with uncertainty. For some emotions (e.g., 
happiness), the affective feelings appraisal and the cognitive certainty appraisal are aligned and 
lead to the same validation outcome.  For other emotions (e.g., anger), the different appraisals 
depart and lead to opposite outcomes.  For example, inducing anger might increase attitude 
certainty if a cognitive (certainty) appraisal is paramount but decrease attitude certainty if an 
affective (valence) appraisal is paramount (Briñol, Petty, Stavraki, Wagner, & Díaz, 2013).   
To examine the possibility of cognitive appraisals of emotions, Tiedens and Linton 
(2001) had participants write about a time they felt angry (certain association) or sad (uncertain 
association), and then exposed them to a persuasive message from a low or high credibility 
source. As past research has suggested that source credibility can serve the role of a simple cue 
when motivation to think is low (see Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981), Tiedens and Linton 
reasoned that individuals’ attitudes should be more affected by the message source cue when 
they were certain of their initial attitudes (i.e., feeling their attitudes were already “right” based 
on their anger), and therefore, not inclined to think further. Indeed, source credibility exerted a 
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greater impact on attitudes when individuals were experiencing an emotion related to certainty 
(e.g., anger) compared to uncertainty (e.g., sadness) prior to the message. These findings support 
the notion that the certainty associated with an emotion provides one way to influence attitude 
certainty that is different from what an affective appraisal of the emotion would imply.  
Multiple Appraisals 
 In this review we have discussed six core appraisals, but our position is not that a 
particular variable is inextricably linked to a single appraisal (e.g., accuracy). Rather, the total 
effect of a particular variable on attitude certainty can reflect multiple underlying appraisals that 
can be additive or even interactive in nature. Although there remains a need for greater research 
exploring multiple appraisal effects, there is initial evidence pointing to the existence of these 
more complex effects.  Our discussion of how emotions can affect certainty reflects this 
complexity, whereby any given emotion could influence certainty either by affective or more 
cognitive appraisals.  Here, we offer additional examples of multiple appraisals that could be 
applied to four variables: source credibility, power, perceived successful resistance, and fluency. 
Source Credibility 
People feel more certain of an attitude when the attitude, or the information supporting 
the attitude, comes from a credible source (see Kruglanski, et al., 2005). For example, Clarkson 
et al. (2008) found that participants were more certain of their attitudes toward a department 
store after receiving a message about that store from a source that was high as opposed to low in 
credibility. Because source credibility can be comprised of expertise or trustworthiness (Eagly & 
Chaiken, 1993; Hass, 1981), or a combination of both, we submit that the effect of credibility on 
certainty may stem from multiple appraisals. For instance, a source’s expertise might lead an 
individual to view his or her information as more correct or true (an accuracy appraisal), as well 
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as more complete (a completeness appraisal). In addition, though, a source’s trustworthiness 
might lead people to assume that his or her information is more relevant, important, and/or 
legitimate, fostering corresponding appraisals. Measuring the specific appraisals stimulated by 
source credibility would enhance our understanding of the effect of source credibility on attitude 
certainty, as well as highlight potential boundary conditions on this effect.  
Power 
A state of high power is associated with behavior that is consistent with feeling certain, 
such as expressing one's opinions in public (Guinote, Judd, & Brauer, 2002; for a review see 
Rucker, Galinsky, &, Dubois 2012). In contrast, low power states have been found to lead people 
to act in a manner consistent with being uncertain (see Anderson & Berdahl, 2002). Briñol, 
Petty, Valle, Rucker, and Becerra (2007) documented a link between feeling powerful and 
feeling confident. Furthermore, they found that when power was manipulated prior to receiving a 
persuasive message, individuals in a low-power state (relative to those in a high-power state) 
processed the subsequent message more carefully. This finding is consistent with the idea that 
power affected the certainty that people associated with their initial pre-message attitudes.  
Although prior research on power did not examine the appraisals underlying the increase 
in certainty, one possibility is that power affected attitude certainty through multiple appraisals. 
Because power has been associated with knowledge (French & Raven, 1959), a sense of power 
might lead people to feel as if are more knowledgeable about a topic (i.e., a completeness 
appraisal). Alternatively, or in addition, power may influence individuals’ certainty through 
affective validation. That is, although power need not affect mood per se (for a review see 
Rucker et al., 2012) feeling powerful might lead individuals to feel good about their attitudes 
because power is associated with a sense of control, which is typically a desirable feeling. 
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Measuring the appraisals influenced by power would help us understand the nature of the effects 
of power on attitude certainty and expand our insight into both power and the certainty construct.  
Perceived Successful Resistance 
As noted earlier, perceiving that one has successfully resisted a strong (but not a weak) 
persuasive message has been shown to increase attitude certainty (Tormala & Petty, 2002, 2004a, 
2004b). This effect might stem from several appraisals associated with perceptions of successful 
resistance. For example, when people repel a strong attack against their attitude, they might infer 
that their attitude already is based on relatively accurate and complete information.  When people 
resist a weak attack, however, they might not view their resistance as particularly impressive, 
because the information underlying an attitude need not be accurate or complete to withstand a 
weak attack. Thus, the link between perceived resistance and certainty might be multiply 
determined by completeness and accuracy appraisals. These appraisals constitute separate valves 
to certainty that could be opened or closed independently or in parallel. 
Processing Fluency 
Several streams of research suggest that processing fluency is associated with feelings of 
certainty (e.g., Tsai & McGill, 2011; Tormala, Petty, & Briñol, 2002). For example, attitudes are 
generally held with greater certainty when they, or the information on which they are based, are 
highly accessible (Bizer, Tormala, Rucker, & Petty, 2006; Holland et al., 2003; Petrocelli et al., 
2007) or brought to mind with subjective ease (e.g., Haddock, Rothman, Reber, & Schwarz, 
1999; see also Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009).  Multiple appraisals could drive these effects.  First, 
fluency may influence attitude certainty through an accuracy appraisal. Research by Kelley and 
Lindsay (1993) suggests that the ease of answering a question is associated with perceived 
accuracy: Individuals view the answer to a question as more likely to be accurate when it comes 
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to mind easily. Thus, if an attitude or attitude-supportive information comes to mind easily, the 
attitude might be assumed to be more accurate or true. Completeness appraisals may also be 
involved.  When individuals find it easy to recall attitude-consistent information, for instance, 
they might infer that they have a lot of information supporting that attitude.  
Because fluency can produce positive affect (Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001), fluency 
may also affect certainty through affective validation. For instance, fluency might lead 
individuals to feel good about their attitude, and this feeling might increase attitude certainty 
(Cesario et al., 2004). This assessment could occur in the absence of any differences in appraisals 
about the accuracy or completeness of the information possessed. For instance, Gill, Swann, and 
Silvera (1998) used priming procedures to make some impressions of a person easier to form 
than others. When priming made judgments easier, those judgments were held with greater 
certainty. In another demonstration, Norwick and Epley (2003) presented participants with 
statements that were either difficult or easy to read and found that participants were more certain 
of a given statement’s truth when the statement was easy to read. In both cases, the information 
itself was held constant; thus, the certainty effects might have worked primarily through an 
affective validation associated with ease. Teasing apart the appraisals underlying fluency effects 
on certainty would be an important direction for future research. 
Hierarchy of Appraisals 
When multiple appraisals are present, one question to consider is how they relate to one 
another. Although speculative at present, we surmise a hierarchy of appraisals might exist where 
the relative weight of one appraisal can be stronger or weaker than the weight of another. For 
example, perhaps individuals are primarily drawn to assessing whether their information is 
relevant and accurate. If the information is inaccurate or irrelevant, the information might have 
 25 
little impact on certainty regardless of how complete, legitimate, and/or important it is deemed to 
be. After all, if information is inaccurate, who cares if it is complete or not!  Perhaps more 
interesting, there may be no fixed appraisal hierarchy.  Rather, the importance, and thus relative 
weighting, of different appraisals might vary as a result of both individual and situational factors. 
As an example of potential individual differences in appraisal hierarchies, imagine two 
consumers who receive new product information. One consumer emphasizes completeness over 
accuracy (i.e., “I want to know everything about this product regardless of whether it is true or 
false.”), whereas the other emphasizes accuracy over completeness (i.e., “I only want to know 
information about this product if I can be sure it is true”). If the new information is lengthy but of 
dubious validity (e.g., a low credible source with a lot to say), that information might increase 
certainty among consumers focused on completeness, but not among consumers focused on 
accuracy. Indeed, fear of invalidity (Thompson et al., 2001) might be one individual difference 
that leads to a greater weighting of accuracy appraisals due to a concern with being wrong. 
In addition, individual difference variables might predict the weight of particular 
appraisals, or the specific sources of validation people seek within a particular appraisal 
category. For example, collectivists (e.g., Triandis, 1995) might be more concerned with some 
sources of accuracy (e.g., social consensus), whereas individualists might be concerned with 
others (e.g., source expertise or completeness). Moreover, differences in need for cognitive 
closure may play a role.  Perhaps individuals low in need for closure are more likely to wait for 
complete information before they feel certain, whereas individuals high in need for closure use 
other means such as securing quick affective validation (Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993). 
Research might also examine whether other individual differences in need for affect (Maio & 
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Esses, 2001) or need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) predict people’s weighting of 
affective validation versus more cognitive appraisals in determining their attitude certainty. 
Contextual factors are also likely to moderate the weighting of different appraisals. For 
example, Fazio (1979) distinguished between construction and validation motives. In this work 
(see also Goethals & Darley, 1977), construction motives focus on forming an attitude, whereas 
validation motives focus on supporting existing attitudes (see also Cohen & Reed, 2006). When 
people are forming an attitude they might weight accuracy of information first and foremost 
since the goal of having attitudes is to create appropriate behavioral guides (Petty & Cacioppo, 
1986). However, when people seek to validate an existing attitude, they might become more 
open to any source of validation, since the goal shifts to supporting an existing attitude. Perhaps 
in the latter case more than the former case, the hierarchy would be subject to bias; people might 
place more weight on appraisals that support their attitudes than those that do not. 
 As a final example, the importance or weight of a given appraisal in a particular situation 
might depend on the extent to which an individual’s attention gravitates toward it. For example, 
consider a message filled with content that represents both sides of an issue (i.e., positive 
completeness appraisal) but comes from an untrustworthy source (i.e., a negative accuracy 
appraisal). If an individual is under time pressure, he or she might look for a simple decision rule 
such as “this comes from an untrustworthy source,” and thus assess the attitude using an 
accuracy appraisal. In contrast, if an individual is not under time pressure, he or she might 
instead attend carefully to the message and focus more on the content (Priester & Petty, 2003), 
which might lead to greater reliance on a completeness appraisal.  
As these examples suggest, although multiple appraisals might be used in any given 
situation, the amount of weight they carry in influencing certainty might be highly dependent on 
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individual and situational factors. Having identified a finite set of certainty appraisals, future 
research could now examine how they are organized and seek to identify the factors that affect 
their relative importance or placement in a hierarchy. We see this as a crucial step for research. 
Moderators of Appraisal-Based Certainty Effects 
 Although the bulk of our attention has focused on identifying the core psychological 
appraisals underlying certainty assessments, it is also important to consider moderators of their 
effects. Ultimately, a number of variables are likely to moderate appraisal effects. This is an 
important and fruitful direction for future research as little prior research has empirically or 
conceptually examined moderators of attitude certainty effects. However, there is evidence for 
two moderators: naïve theories and elaboration.  
Naïve Theories 
 Considerable research now suggests that people’s naïve theories – that is, their own 
beliefs about the relationships between variables – are critical elements for understanding the 
effect of one variable on another (e.g., Briñol, Petty, & Tormala, 2006; see Petty et al., 2007). 
Work on bias correction, for instance, suggests that how people adjust for a potentially biasing 
influence on judgment largely depends on their own naïve theories regarding the presumed 
impact of the bias (e.g., Wegener & Petty, 1995). Similarly, work on the persuasion knowledge 
model (Friestad & Wright, 1994, 1995) suggests that different consumers have different theories 
about how persuasion affects them and that this, in turn, produces different behaviors. 
 Tormala, Clarkson, and Henderson (2011) provided recent support for the idea that naïve 
theories can influence attitude certainty. In one study, participants considered their attitude on a 
novel topic and then reported it when ready. After participants reported their attitudes, they were 
given false feedback that they had taken more or less time to evaluate the topic than most other 
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participants. When participants believed that thoughtful consideration tended to produce better 
judgment, they became more certain of their attitudes when they perceived that they spent more 
rather than less time evaluating. When participants believed that going with their gut reactions 
tended to produce better judgment, they became more certain of their attitudes when they 
perceived that they spent less rather than more time evaluating. In each case, participants 
presumably linked evaluative quickness to certainty through an accuracy appraisal, but the 
direction of that link varied depending on participants’ naïve theories.     
 Rydell, Hugenberg, and McConnell (2006) also explored the influence of naïve theories 
on attitude certainty. The authors hypothesized that people who viewed resistance favorably 
would show greater certainty after successfully resisting strong arguments, as in past research 
(Tormala & Petty, 2002). For people with naïve theories that resistance was bad, successfully 
resisting persuasion would suggest that they acted in a manner that contradicted their beliefs (i.e., 
“I think resistance is bad, but I just resisted!”), which would lead to less attitude certainty. To test 
this idea, Rydell et al. manipulated participants’ beliefs that people who resist persuasion are 
intelligent and have good insight into their opinions (i.e., resistance is good) or unintelligent and 
have poor insight into their opinions (i.e., resistance is bad). Participants then were induced to 
resist arguments for a new university policy. When resistance was framed as good, participants 
were more certain of their attitudes when they had resisted a strong message. However, this 
effect was eliminated when resistance was framed as bad. We surmise that in the Rydell et al. 
studies, naïve theories that resisting persuasion was good or bad may have activated legitimacy 
appraisals and then moderated whether resistance seemed legitimate or illegitimate as a source of 
certainty.  As an additional possibility, the effects might have been driven by accuracy appraisals 
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to the extent that naïve theories highlighted situational consistencies (e.g., “resistance is good 
and I just resisted”) or inconsistencies (e.g., “resistance is bad, but I just resisted”). 
In related research, Tsai and McGill (2011) explored the effect of fluency on choice 
confidence. When consumers made product choices at lower or more concrete construal levels, 
feelings of fluency increased choice confidence as consumers focused on product feasibility and 
fluency promoted that perception. At higher or more abstract construal levels fluency led 
consumers to have less choice confidence, because they were more attuned to desirability and 
they associated more effort with more desirable outcomes.  Thus, Tsai and McGill found that 
fluency could have a positive or negative effect on confidence depending on the salient lay 
theory, which appeared to vary according to construal level. From an appraisals perspective, one 
possibility is that fluency affected certainty through different appraisals at different levels of 
construal.  For example, higher construal levels are known to foster more abstract thinking, 
whereas lower levels are known to foster more concrete thinking on the immediate aspects of 
one’s environment (Maglio & Trope, 2011). One possibility is that a broader abstract mindset 
induced people to think about the completeness of information beyond the present context. And, 
perhaps when focused on completeness appraisals, more fluent processing fostered a sense of 
less effort or thoughtfulness and thus less certainty. In contrast, at lower construal levels, 
consumers may have focused on their immediate feelings in the situation, leading to a focus on 
affective validation. Here, processing fluency may have served as an indication that using the 
product will “be good” or “feel right.” Alternatively, fluency might have affected certainty 
through the very same completeness appraisal but with different inferences as a function of 
construal level. At higher construal levels, fluency might have reduced certainty because 
consumers thought they had not been careful in their information search. At lower construal 
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levels, fluency might have increased certainty because consumers thought they already knew 
enough and therefore had complete knowledge (e.g., Maglio & Trope, 2011).  Although at 
present it is unknown whether different appraisals operated in this research, or the same appraisal 
was differentially affected as a function of construal level, this provides an example of how the 
present framework can be used to revisit past findings and stimulate additional research.  
To the extent that individuals possess different naïve theories about how a variable 
affects certainty, or other variables moderate the appraisal drawn or how the same appraisal is 
used (e.g., construal level), the same variable (e.g., fluency) may produce very different effects 
on attitude certainty. However, it appears there is often a default or dominant meaning for many 
variables in relation to certainty, producing an overall main effect as observed in many studies 
where naïve theories have not been measured or moderators have not been introduced.  
Elaboration 
 Although consumers care about and reflect on their certainty, it would be an 
overstatement to suggest that they always initiate an appraisal process when they receive a 
persuasive message or other attitude-relevant information. Following the general logic that 
metacognitive reasoning requires cognitive effort (Petty et al., 2007), we propose that the 
appraisal process will be most likely to occur when people have high motivation and ability to 
think. Consistent with this notion, research has shown that the effect of resisting a strong 
persuasive message on attitude certainty is more likely to emerge when individuals are high in 
need for cognition or low in cognitive load (see Tormala & Petty, 2004a, 2004b), both of which 
have been associated with elevated processing activity (e.g., Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). Similarly, 
Rucker et al. (2008) found that participants were more certain of their attitudes after receiving a 
persuasive message portrayed as having considered both sides of an issue, but only when they 
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were high in need for cognition. These findings provide an early indication that appraisals are 
likely to operate and guide certainty judgments under conditions of high thought. 
A Framework for Appraisal-Based Certainty 
 Having outlined our key ideas to this point, we now summarize the insights provided in 
this review as a new framework of appraisal-based certainty, depicted in Figure 1. First, 
individuals must have the motivation and ability to process information and assess the validity of 
their attitudes. If either the motivation or ability to engage in an appraisal process is absent, then 
attitude certainty is not likely to be influenced through appraisals. Second, if the motivation and 
ability to process and assess validity are present, individuals can appraise the information 
underlying their attitudes on one of the six dimensions we have outlined. The salience of various 
pieces of information, and of the appraisals themselves, along with contextual factors, 
determines their hierarchy or relative weight in the certainty assessment. Third, if the overall 
summary of the appraisals leads people to be impressed with the evidence underlying (or affect 
associated with) their attitude, a positive appraisal results and attitude certainty is increased. If 
the summary of the appraisals leads people to be unimpressed with the evidence underlying (or 
affect associated with) their attitude, a negative appraisal results and attitude certainty is 
undermined. Finally, if an individual is neither impressed nor unimpressed with the evidence or 
affect associated with an attitude, or simply does not engage in the appraisal process, then 
attitude certainty should remain the same. 
Predictive Value of the Appraisal-Based Certainty Framework 
Thus far, we have focused our efforts on providing an explanatory framework for past 
findings in the attitude certainty literature. However, this framework has additional value 
because it allows researchers to generate predictions regarding if, how, and when new variables 
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might affect attitude certainty. For example, by considering which appraisals are associated with 
a newly identified variable, one can formulate specific predictions as to whether or not that 
variable will affect attitude certainty and what the direction of the effect will be.  
Consider source attractiveness and message length.  Although both variables have been 
examined with respect to their effects on attitudes (e.g., Chaiken, 1979; Petty & Cacioppo, 1984; 
Wood, Kallgren, & Preisler, 1985), they have not been studied in attitude certainty research. Is 
there likely to be any effect of these variables on certainty? To start, it seems unlikely that 
information from a physically attractive source would be assessed as any more accurate, 
complete, relevant, important, or legitimate than information from an unattractive source. 
Attractive sources also seem unlikely to provide a strong affective validation (unless 
attractiveness fosters positive mood, which might induce feelings of certainty). Thus, on balance, 
we would not anticipate a strong association between source attractiveness and attitude certainty.  
In contrast, for message length an effect seems more plausible. In this case, a message 
that appears longer could induce a completeness appraisal because people assume they have 
received more information from a longer message. If true, longer messages should produce 
greater certainty than shorter messages. In fact, even messages that merely seem longer (Tormala 
& Petty, 2007) should be capable of affecting certainty through a completeness appraisal. On the 
face of it, there is less reason to expect message length to affect relevance or legitimacy 
appraisals because both long and short messages could be high or low on either of these 
dimensions. Still, based on our assumptions of how source attractiveness and message length 
plausibly relate to the core appraisals, our framework suggests that message length is more likely 
to affect attitude certainty than physical attractiveness (though both have been shown to affect 
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attitudes themselves), that longer messages would yield more certainty than shorter messages, 
and that this effect would driven by a completeness appraisal. 
The predictive utility of the appraisals identified in our framework is particularly salient 
in the context of multiple opposing appraisals. Imagine that a given researcher conducts a study 
to determine the effect of message complexity on attitude certainty, reasoning that because 
complex messages are more difficult to process (see Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009), they should 
reduce attitude certainty. This researcher observes a null effect and then concludes that 
processing difficulty must not undermine certainty. Viewed in light of multiple appraisals and 
joint effects, however, there may be reason to suspect that there is such an effect but that an 
opposing appraisal process related to completeness suppressed it. For example, perhaps when 
consumers receive complex messages, they activate two opposing appraisals: a negative 
appraisal tied to affective validation (i.e., “this was hard to process so I don’t feel great about my 
assessment of it”) and a positive appraisal tied to completeness (i.e., “this was hard to process so 
I read it several times to make sure I got all the information”). Considering multiple appraisals 
helps shed light on the co-determinants of certainty and can expand our understanding of how 
situational factors can make consumers feel certain or uncertain. In short, our framework 
provides a structure for considering the nuanced links between a particular variable and attitude 
certainty. In the case of message complexity, the solution to uncovering a certainty effect might 
be to guide participants to make one appraisal rather than the other. 
The appraisal framework also accommodates moderation hypotheses. Consider the 
previous hypothesis that a longer message promotes certainty through a completeness appraisal. 
Having identified the focal appraisal, it is possible to generate hypotheses regarding whether a 
variables will moderate the effect. Specifically, variables related (unrelated) to the specific 
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appraisal should be more (less) likely to moderate it. In the case of the long message, if the effect 
is driven solely by completeness appraisals, that effect might turn on and off in response to other 
variables influencing perceptions of completeness. For example, if a consumer is (or perceives 
herself to be) an expert on a topic, she should believe she already has considerable information, 
which could attenuate the impact of any new variable (like message length) fostering perceptions 
of completeness. When the consumer is a novice (or perceives herself as such), however, 
message length should exert greater effect on attitude certainty because existing completeness 
perceptions might be more modest. Thus, by understanding the relevant appraisals, researchers 
are better positioned to generate theory-driven predictions about moderation.  
Appraisal-Based Certainty: Comparison with Past Models Involving Attitude Certainty  
Next, we offer a brief review of influential theories of attitudes and persuasion that have 
in some way dealt with attitude certainty. In this review, we highlight the uniqueness of the 
appraisal perspective, which fills a gap in the literature by delving into to the specific processes 
through which consumers form and adjust their own certainty assessments.  
Comparison Models 
Attitude certainty has been featured prominently in both classic and contemporary 
models of comparison.  In social comparison theory, for instance, Festinger (1954) posited that 
people are motivated to hold attitudes about which they can feel certain. Festinger proposed that 
individuals seek to gain certainty using objective means when possible (e.g., “Does this bicycle 
have the features I require?”), but in the absence of objective information they use other people’s 
attitudes (i.e., social consensus) as a reference (e.g., “Do other people like this bicycle?”). Social 
comparison theory speaks to the importance of certainty as a psychological need, and suggests 
that objective information in the environment as well as the opinions of others can serve as 
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crucial inputs. This theory highlights the accuracy dimension of certainty in that Festinger 
assumed that people seek correctness in their opinions by comparing them with the opinions of 
others.  The current framework goes beyond social comparison theory by identifying 
determinants of certainty other than perceived accuracy. 
Albarracín, Wallace, and Glasman (2004) proposed an activation and comparison model 
of attitude change that considers the role of attitude certainty. This model proposes that 
understanding attitude change requires the examination of three processes: (a) activation of a 
prior attitude from memory, (b) activation of information related to the prior attitude, from 
memory or from an external source, and (c) comparison of the attitude with the activated 
information. According to the model, when the information is consistent with the prior attitude, 
that attitude becomes polarized in both extremity and certainty. However, attitude-inconsistent 
information does not necessarily change the certainty of the initial attitude. In this case, people 
who compare a prior attitude with new inconsistent information might reach a compromise 
between the two positions without altering their certainty. This model provides insight into one 
input into attitude certainty (i.e., consistency), which we accommodate in our framework, but it 
does not delve into the appraisals this input stimulates or examine other potential processes. 
Persuasion Models 
  Certainty also has featured prominently in dual-process theories of persuasion such as the 
Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM, Chaiken et al., 1989) and the Elaboration-Likelihood Model 
(ELM, Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Both models propose that people process persuasive messages 
more extensively when they feel uncertain or when they feel a need to be more certain about an 
attitude. According to the ELM, people’s motivation to think about information stems from a 
desire to hold correct attitudes (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Thus, people process more when the 
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need for a correct attitude is greater, such as when the attitude object or issue is of high personal 
relevance (Petty & Cacioppo, 1990).  In the HSM, the motivation to think about information 
stems from having a degree of certainty that is less than desired (Chaiken et al., 1989).  In 
addition, the ELM holds that as thinking about an attitude object increases, certainty in the 
attitude also increases and this enhanced certainty is one reason for why elaboration increases 
attitude strength (Petty, Haugtvedt, & Smith, 1995). Thus, these dual process models suggest that 
thorough processing can be both a consequence of and solution for uncertainty, and that 
enhanced processing can increase attitude certainty.  However, because these models are not 
focused on the aspects of information that lead people to be more or less certain, they do not 
provide insight into appraisal processes or even the antecedents of certainty more broadly.  
Associative Attitude Models 
According to the meta-cognitive model of attitudes (MCM; Petty, 2006; Petty & Briñol, 
2006), people’s stored evaluations are accompanied by validity assessments. In this model, 
attitude objects can be associated with both positive and negative evaluations (e.g., Cacioppo & 
Berntson, 1994) and each of these evaluations can be associated with separate validity 
assessments that can be reflected in certainty judgments. This model holds that old attitudes are 
not erased when change occurs (see also Wilson et al., 2000); instead, old attitudes receive a 
“tag” indicating that they are invalid. Because invalidity assessments are tag-based, in some 
circumstances (e.g., when under cognitive load; or when completing an automatic attitude 
measure) people will retrieve the old attitude but not the invalidity (low confidence) assessment, 
in which case people might use or report their old attitude as if it reflects their current view.  
In a similar vein, the Associative-Propositional Evaluation (APE; Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2006) model distinguishes between associative evaluations (implicit attitudes or 
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automatic affective reactions) and propositional evaluations (explicit attitudes or evaluative 
judgments based on syllogistic inferences). The APE model suggests that people can consider the 
truth value of both their affective associations and their more explicit evaluations through 
propositional processes involving syllogistic reasoning. In essence, the truth value can be 
construed as an on-line certainty assessment. However, in contrast to the MCM, the APE model 
makes no assumption that attitude certainty or validity information is stored in memory. Most 
germane for the current purposes, neither the MCM nor the APE offers explicit details about the 
specific inputs into the validation process. Thus, unlike our appraisals perspective, it is unclear 
what people draw upon to assess their certainty.  
Attitude Appraisal Models 
A final set of models link attitudes to behavior by proposing that individuals reflect on 
their attitudes to ascertain whether those attitudes are appropriate behavioral guides. Lynch and 
colleagues (Feldman & Lynch, 1988; Lynch, 2006) proposed an accessibility-diagnosticity 
model, suggesting that an attitude’s influence on behavior depends on whether that attitude is 
accessible and viewed as diagnostic. Lynch (2006) noted that diagnosticity has been 
operationalized in terms of relevance, importance, and certainty. However, the process by which 
an attitude comes to be viewed as diagnostic, or held with certainty, is unclear. Also germane, 
attitudes are seen as diagnostic (or not) for a particular behavior or situation rather than as 
something about which people might be generally certain. That is, in the accessibility-
diagnosticity model, diagnosticity is viewed as contextual or state-dependent, whereas we 
assume that attitude certainty can be more stable and hold across time and situations, though 
some of the appraisal inputs to certainty (e.g., relevance) can vary from one situation to the next.  
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 Cohen and Reed (2006) proposed a multiple pathway anchoring and adjustment (MPAA) 
model that explores issues related to diagnosticity (see Lynch, 2006). The MPAA suggests that 
people ask themselves two questions in deciding whether to use an attitude as a guide for 
behavior. First, individuals ask themselves whether they have a clear and well-formed attitude on 
a topic. Second, individuals ask themselves whether their attitude gives them a good basis to 
proceed or engage in a behavior. Cohen and Reed (2006) define the first question as an 
assessment of “representational sufficiency” and the second as an assessment of “functional 
sufficiency” (see Petrocelli et al., 2007, for a related distinction between attitude clarity and 
attitude correctness). Cohen and Reed suggest that people are likely to use an accessible attitude 
when it meets their requirements for both representational and functional sufficiency. 
Importantly, though, in the MPAA too there is little attempt to chart the antecedents of certainty 
or the processes driving people’s adjustments to their own level of certainty.  
In summary, many models of attitude formation and change have recognized or 
incorporated some element of attitude certainty.  The mere presence of these models is a 
testament to the importance of attitude certainty in the attitudes and persuasion literature, and in 
consumer psychology more generally. However, in contrast to our appraisal-based certainty 
framework, none of these models has provided a thorough examination of the inputs into attitude 
certainty, outlined the underlying processes through which attitude certainty assessments are 
made, or offered predictions for how new variables will affect attitude certainty.  
Future Directions 
The introduction of an appraisal-based perspective on certainty paves the way for a 
number of interesting future research directions. Although we have discussed possible future 
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directions throughout the course of this review, here we highlight several additional directions 
that we believe an appraisal-based perspective on attitude certainty sparks. 
Differential Consequences Based on the Underlying Appraisal 
One intriguing direction for future research is to examine whether the specific appraisal 
that underlies one’s certainty is of any consequence. That is, if two consumers have the same 
degree of certainty, does it matter if one consumer’s certainty stems from an accuracy appraisal 
and another consumer’s certainty stems from a completeness appraisal? One possibility is that 
once certainty is formed, the underlying appraisal is no longer crucial; that what matters is the 
stored summary judgment of certainty. This would not mean that the appraisals documented here 
are unimportant, as they still allow one to make predictions about how a variable affects 
certainty, but it would suggest that the underlying appraisal might be less crucial for an attitude’s 
influence and stability once the certainty judgment has been reached.  
An alternative possibility is that the underlying appraisals matter, even after certainty has 
been formed. For example, perhaps certainty based on one appraisal (e.g., accuracy) leads to 
attitudes that are more or less influential, persistent, and/or susceptible to change than does 
certainty based on another appraisal (e.g., legitimacy). Or perhaps the influence of an appraisal 
varies by context. As one possibility, it could be that the durability of an attitude depends on the 
type of attack one receives. A matching perspective (see Petty, Wheeler, & Bizer, 2000, for a 
review) might predict that if an individual’s attitude certainty is based largely on an accuracy 
appraisal, attacking the accuracy of the attitude or supportive information could be more 
effective than attacking the completeness of one’s information. In contrast, perhaps it is easier to 
undermine an attitude by attacking an appraisal that has not contributed to the certainty of one’s 
attitude. If one believes that one has accurate information, for example, but has not considered 
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the completeness of this information, one might be less resistant to an appeal focused on the lack 
of complete information rather than one that emphasizes having inaccurate information. 
Exploring these possibilities would provide additional value to the framework by further 
establishing the importance of understanding the distinct appraisal processes that shape certainty. 
Understanding Appraisals Operating in Past Research 
Future work could revisit existing findings from the perspective of certainty appraisals. 
Whereas past research on attitude certainty has focused on linking a variable to attitude certainty 
through a single process, our framework suggests that multiple appraisals can operate in parallel. 
Thus, it may be worth conducting further investigations of established findings. For instance, 
Tormala et al. (2006) found that participants were more certain of their attitudes when they had 
more time to counterargue an attack compared when they had little time to counterargue. 
Tormala et al. suggested that this effect could stem from the ease or difficulty with which 
participants generated counterarguments (i.e., more time led to easier counterarguing). However, 
less time to counterargue might have also induced people to perceive their attitudes to be based 
on fewer arguments (a completeness appraisal) or might have made it less clear that they had 
valid reasons to support their own attitudes (an accuracy appraisal). Past findings could be 
reexamined with a more focused lens to uncover these effects.   
Implications for Implicit Attitudes 
Whereas we have largely focused our review on explicitly reported attitude certainty, the 
Meta-Cognitive Model (MCM, Petty, Briñol, & DeMarree, 2007), described earlier, examines 
certainty in automatic associations stored in memory. Similar to research described in this review 
on how metacognitive confidence increases the use of an attitude, the MCM postulates that the 
more confidence people have in the validity of an automatic evaluation, the more likely they are 
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to report it on a deliberative measure. An interesting direction for future research would be to 
examine how the confidence associated with implicit or automatic associations is affected by the 
specific appraisals summarized here surrounding people’s explicit level of attitude certainty. 
Initial research suggests that implicit and explicit attitude certainty may be affected through 
different processes. For example, preliminary evidence suggests that implicit-explicit 
discrepancies affect the degree of implicit certainty people have in their attitudes but do not 
affect attitude certainty as measured with traditional deliberative measures (Petty & Briñol, 
2009).  This is an interesting area for future research.  
Understanding When a Variable Yields a Positive versus Negative Appraisal 
 A final direction for future work would be to understand when the same variable affects a 
particular appraisal in different directions. For example, we previously discussed how mood may 
affectively validate one’s attitude both through its valence (Briñol et al., 2007) and its cognitive 
associations with certainty (Tiedens & Linton, 2001). A remaining question is what determines 
whether one’s appraisal focus is on the valence of the mood versus the cognitive associations of 
certainty or uncertainty. As noted, the initial work on validation thorough happiness (vs. sadness) 
does not allow these possibilities to be disentangled because both emotions work in the same 
direction on the pleasantness-unpleasantness and confidence-doubt dimensions.  However, other 
emotions, such as anger and surprise, do not have these dimensions confounded. Anger is an 
unpleasant emotion that is associated with confidence whereas surprise is a relatively pleasant 
emotion associated with doubt (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Tiedens & Linton, 2001).  In a series 
of recent studies, Briñol and colleagues (2013) suggested that people can be induced to focused 
on either the affective or cognitive appraisals. Specifically, the authors found that when 
participants were induced to focus on the cognitive appraisal of confidence/doubt, then feeling 
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angry led them to more reliance on their views than surprise because anger enhanced confidence 
in the accuracy of one’s views (cognitive validation).  In contrast, when participants were 
focused on the affective appraisal of pleasantness/unpleasantness, then feeling angry led to less 
use of participants initial views than surprise because anger enhanced perceptions of feeling bad 
about or disliking one’s views (affective validation).   
Conclusion 
 In their pivotal review of attitude certainty nearly two decades ago, Gross and colleagues 
(1995) concluded by stating that, “70 years have proved insufficient to provide a satisfying 
account of the dynamics of opinion certainty. Perhaps, however, less additional time will be 
needed to weave a cohesive whole out of the fragments we have discussed.” In conducting this 
review, we have organized and expanded current understandings of attitude certainty by 
identifying a finite set of appraisals from which attitude certainty can be derived. In so doing, we 
offer a new theoretical account of how people assess their certainty following the formation, 
change, or maintenance of their attitudes and underlying beliefs. Furthermore, our framework 
presents new opportunities for consumer psychologists to become more engaged in the study of 
attitude certainty, its antecedents, and its numerous consequences for consumer thought and 
action. Our review has raised unanswered questions about attitude certainty in its many 
derivations, and we hope that our framework will provide some guidance and direction in 
exploring these important issues. 
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Figure 1. A Framework for Appraisal-Based Certainty 
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